With any information at all, we can assume that each voter has a prob- ability p > .5. In Palfrey and Rosenthal's model, a correct understanding of political partici- pation does not require a relaxation of the rationality assumption directly, but rather of players' beliefs about others' rationality. At the very least, the in- formational properties of majority rule are a factor to be considered in the de- sign of political (and market) institu- tions. Presented at the international conference on "Economic Theories of Politics." A voter whose party differential is non-zero can be counted on to vote if the costs of voting are zero. C. Confronting Information Aggregation Outside the Marketplace. As play- ers in the game become aware of how others are playing the game, they adjust their beliefs and their own play, causing other players to adjust as well. Even in those stringent conditions, incumbents slowly converged to the median voter's preferred outcome. SPENCE, A. MICHAEL. From the standpoint of social ra- tionality, the context of interpersonal and group relationships defines the means by which rational individuals can further their basic goals. Graduate students in many areas of political science must have some working understanding (if not sympathy toward) the more famous ra- tional choice models or else they cannot hope to regard themselves as adequately trained in electoral behavior, legislative behavior, public policy, and increasingly in international relations and comparative politics as well. J 6(1),pp 5-28. , LEDYARD, JOHN. For example, each must believe that others contribute more when she herself contributes more-a belief that is inconsistent with her own behavior, and which may easily be proved wrong.
-. "Information Aggregation by Ma- jorit Rule." For example, in a laboratory experi- ment on free riding in contribution threshold games, anomalous levels of individual behavior can be explained by optimistic misapprehensions about other players' willingness to contribute (Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal 1991, p. 241). E BERNARD GKOFMAN. How- ever, it is also safe to say that the evi- dence gathered in the confrontation of economic models with political reality has the potential for transforming eco- nomics as well.
"Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," Amer. As in the work of Opp and Uhlaner on protest movements and interest groups, Ostrom's work on commons di- lemmas is essentially social; success or disaster in the commons cannot be pre- dicted or described by reference to in- dividual decisions alone.
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